## 1AC

### Contention 1 – Inherency

#### Currently US policy toward “Latin America” ignores the differences between countries.

**Neves 12**

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Part of the problem stems from different perceptions on both countries. While **Washington still approaches Latin America with a Manichean mentality remnant of the cold war,** Brasília seems to have a hard time drawing attention from the American foreign policy establishment. Frequently many **U.S. policy initiatives toward the region are perceived by Brazil as responses to other issues that alarm Washington. Concerns about Communism and, more recently, about populist nationalism, terrorism and the growing pull of China’s economic presence are often the driving forces behind the U.S. Latin American agenda. This approach, however, tends to distort the political and economic nuances that exist in the region.** Many of the very same policy initiatives from Washington that are seen as promising opportunities for some countries are met with much more skepticism or even resistance by Brazil. Free trade negotiations and, to a certain degree, military cooperation are but a few examples of this. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine Brazil having any influence over U.S. relations with Mexico, Central America, Colombia or even Chile. If this is really the case, it seems that **the idea of Latin America, still widespread in Washington’s policy circles, is outdated. In fact, since the late-1990s, for example, Brasília has redrawn the limits of its regional strategic boundaries to encompass only South America.**

#### Economic engagement with Mexico, Cuba, and Venezuela is inevitable. The question is whether it will be through a regional policy toward Latin America or through unilateral economic policies.

**Berry 13**

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In the not-so-distant past**, U.S.-Latin American relations were characterized by a bloc approach to the region by American policymakers who sought to contain the “threat” of global communism through unilateral military interventions and behind the scenes regime manipulations.** Today, however, **it has become clear that it is a misnomer to refer to U.S.-Latin American relations, whether diplomatic, economic, or security in nature, without making clear distinctions about the differences in policies and priorities in the region.** In Brazil and Mexico, where the thrust of U.S. policy has been economic integration and promotion of neoliberal trade policy, recent diplomatic tension sparked over the revelations of  NSA monitoring of executive communications have strained both bilateral relationships. However, Brazil and Mexico are responding in distinct manners. President Rousseff of Brazil [met](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/06/us-usa-security-snowden-brazil-idUSBRE9850F720130906) with President Obama in a side meeting at the G20 in St. Petersburg, Russia, and later suggested via twitter that Washington’s handling of the issue will determine whether Rousseff meets with Obama on October 23rd as scheduled to discuss a $4 billion jet-fighter deal and cooperation on energy technology. For its part, the Peña-Nieto administration [declined](http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/brazil-mexico-nsa-spying/index.html?hpt=ila_c2) to offer a comment on the issue.  The two very different strategies demonstrated by Brazil and Mexico highlight both the unique relationship each has with the United States and domestic political considerations. Rousseff is anxious to regain diplomatic prowess and political capital following the scandal with Bolivian Senator Pinto Molina, and Mexico may hold off criticism for now to continue working closely with the United States on security issues. The United States has also [focused](http://www.ustr.gov/uscolombiatpa) on economic cooperation with Colombia, as exemplified by the Trade Promotion Agreement that was signed in 2006 but that did not go into force until May 15, 2012. Through the elimination of tariffs and other non trade barriers, the flow of U.S. agricultural commodities has increased consistent with the drop in cost. This has [resulted](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23903099) in significant tensions with Colombian farmers and others sympathetic to the destabilizing economic effects of international competition and American agricultural subsidies that comprise an integral part of the [annual farm bill](http://farm.ewg.org/).  **Though at some points tenuous, U.S. relations with countries such as** Brazil, **Mexico**, and Colombia **are generally vigorous and practical, while many other countries in the region find themselves diametrically opposed to U.S. influence. Venezuela and Cuba are examples of this, but they too inevitably interact with the U.S., whether through the increased American** [purchase](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/americas/venezuelas-role-as-oil-power-diminished.html?_r=0) **of Venezuelan state-owned oil reserves, gradual** [integration](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/31/strait_talk?wp_login_redirect=0) **with Raul Castro’s regime, or meeting regarding security arrangements.** Bolivia has taken yet another approach to its relationship with the United States with the Morales administration’s [expulsion](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324266904578456743795195024.html) of USAID earlier this year. Granted, there are certain trends in Latin American political, social, and economic development that set the tone for U.S.-Latin American relations in the 21st century. However, as these short comparisons demonstrate, the U.S. is beginning to understand Latin America as a mosaic rather than a homogenous mass. **The question at hand is whether the United States will use this more nuanced approach for arrangements that are genuinely mutually beneficial, or whether more conventional motivations will prevail.**

### Contention 2 – Homogenization

#### The phrase Latin America does not refer to any particular country. This allows otherization, colonialization, and cultural homogenization. This only defines nations in their relation to the United States.

**LaFalce 11**

The others By [Maggie LaFalce](http://www.dukechronicle.com/staff/maggie-lafalce/articles) | November 9, 2011 *http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2011/11/10/others*

The term “Latino” was originally a construct of the U.S. Census Bureau, created as a more inclusive alternative to “Hispanic.” In itself, the term conveys very little. It is devoid of any specific indication of race, as **the history of Latin America is one of a mixing of slaves from Africa, indigenous populations and European colonizers. Likewise, the word does not refer to any particular country of origin and doesn’t specify language, culture or religion.** In fact, as it is used in the U.S., the term really only tells us that the person lives or originally came from somewhere south of the U.S. border.

In this way, it seems to corral otherwise dissimilar groups of people into one vaguely defined category, **thus resulting in the cultural “othering” of Latin America. If we consider the origins of the lexicon used to describe Latin America, we can see a pattern. The phrase “Latin America” was first used by Napoleon III of France in a campaign to exert imperial control over Latin America by implying cultural similarity within the entire region. Even at the beginning, the vocabulary used to describe the region attempted to fabricate some kind of overall cohesion or homogeneity within Latin America with the objective of political control.** Definitions of Latin America frequently try to point out some overarching factor that allows for some degree of similarity in the region. Often, the common factor that is identified is the socioeconomic legacy of a colonial past. But **this continues the pattern of defining Latin America and its populations in terms of their relation to outside forces. Cohesion is either derived from a common history of western intervention and imperialism or is defined by a common geography: south of the United States. Both of these perspectives omit references to a clear cultural similarity within the region and categorize Latin America on the basis of its relationship with the United States** or Western Europe.

#### The lack of focus on individual countries leads to the homogenization of Latin America.

**Allock 08**

1Thomas Tunstall AllcockDid the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson and the Appointment of Thomas C.Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Mark an End to the Idealistic Approach towards Latin America of John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress? Dissertation submitted in partial requirement for the Degree of MA. in American Foreign Policy, University of Nottingham, 2008. <http://edissertations.nottingham.ac.uk/2520/1/08MAaaxtt.pdf>

On a similar note, **as the Alliance involved all of Latin America bar Cuba, the sheer diversity of these nations will mean that some generalisations will unfortunately be necessary,** although as one Alliance official observed in 1966 ‘the diversity of Latin America makes it dangerous to generalize. But as a region it confronts problems common in varying degrees to most, if not all, its members.’9This necessity would also have posed more of a problem had **U.S. policy makers** not **approached Latin America with, in the words of Enrique Lerdau, ‘a global and homogenous interpretation of hemispheric problems that would lend itself to a global and homogenous set of remedies.’10As policies were rarely created on a nation by nation basis, the need to focus on individual countries is therefore diminished.**

#### Cultural homogenization culminates in genocide and eradicationism.

**Conversi 10**

Cultural Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocide Daniele Conversi

Ikerbasque Foundation Research Professor, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

easyweb.easynet.co.uk/conversi/ISA.pdf

**Cultural homogenization, ethnic cleansing, and genocide can be seen as part of a continuum.** Throughout the modern era, states have forced their citizens to conform to common standards and cultural patterns. **The goal has often been to seek congruence between ethnic and political boundaries; that is, to forge cohesive, unified commun-ities of citizens under governmental control. Cultural homogenizationis defined here as a state-led policy aimed at cultural standardization and the overlap between state and culture. As the goal is frequently to impose the culture of dominant elites on the rest of the citizenry, it consists basically of a top-down process where the state seeks to nationalize “the masses**.”Modern history abounds with examples of discriminatory legislation directed against specific cultural practices and minority languages (see Fishman 1997; Romaine 2002). These have often verged on “linguistic genocide” or linguicide(Skutnabb-Kangas 2000).Cultural homogenization needs to be distinguished from homogeneity. Whereas cultural homogenization is a historically documented occurrence, homogeneityper se is an ideological construct. The idea of human homogeneitypresupposes the existence of a unified, organic community and does not describe an actual phenomenon. In the eyes of many leaders, conformity and standardization meant not only functional-ity and efficiency, but also obedience to common laws. In the early twentieth century many governments began to see assimilation as an inadequate measure. **Plans for population transfers and the physical elimination of communities were conceived. They were conjured up by “nationalizing” states, particularly in times of war. Typically, this process has been facilitated by totalitarian rule. Majoritarian democracies have also embraced assimilationist agendas, sometimes endorsing population transfers.Genocide and ethnic cleansing can be described as a form of “social engineering” and radical homogenization. This is supported by evidence that the elimination of entire communities was often accompanied by the destruction of their cultural herit-age. Terms like eliminationism(see also Carmichael 2009) or eradicationismare used to encompass various forms of state-led homogenizing practices.**

#### And genocide outweighs omnicide.

**Lang 03**

Act and idea in the Nazi genocide‬ By Berel Lang professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan, 2003, pg 12-13‬‬‬

Before considering further the two primary factors in the concept of genocide (the specification of the group and the intention related to its destruction), it is important to recognize the implied relation between these factors, on the hand, and the likely agents of genocide, on the other. That genocide entails the destruction of a group does not imply that the act of genocide itself must be the act of a group; but the practical implementation of a design for genocide would almost necessarily be so complex as to assure this. Admittedly; the same technological advances that make genocide increasingly possible as a collective action also have increased the possibility that an individual acting alone could initiate the process. (**When the push of a single button can produce cataclysmic effects, we discover an order of destruction-“omnicide**”-even larger than genocide.)'1' **But the opprobrium attached to the term “genocide” seems also to have the connotation of a corporate action--as if this act or sequence of acts would be a lesser fault, easier to understand if not to excuse if one person rather than a group were responsible for it. A group (we suppose) would be bound by a public moral code; decisions made would have been reached collectively; and the culpability of individual intentions would be multiplied proportionately.** Admittedly, corporate responsibility is sometimes invoked in order to diminish (or at least to obscure) individual responsibility; so, for example, the “quagmire” effect that was appealed to retrospectively by defenders of the United States’ role in Vietnam. But **for genocide, the likelihood of its corporate origins seems to accentuate its moral enormity: a large number of individual, intentional acts would have to be committed and the connections among them also affirmed in onder to produce the extensive act. Unlike other corporate acts that might be not only decided on but carried out by a single person or small group of persons, genocide in its scope seems necessarily to require collaboration by a relatively large number of agents acting both collectively and individually.**

#### Ideologies about “Latin America” cannot be separated from the word choices. This is true in both academic and governmental circles. This raises an epistemological question about the reality of the status quo.

**Gregory 11**

Derek Gregory (Prof of Geography at University of British Columbia, Ron Johnston (Prof of Geography at Univ of Bristol), Geraldine Pratt (Prof of Geography at University of British Columbia), Michael Watts (Prof of Geography at University of California), Sarah Whatmore (Prof of Environment and Public Policy at Oxford) **The Dictionary of Human Geography (Google Books)**

Drawing from Edward Said's understanding of ORIENTALISM. Mark T. Berger(1995) argues that **ideas about Lath America in the USA are inseparable from and the effect of US imperialism it the region. Berger elaborates this argument along three lines. First. he points to the blurred boundaries between the state and Latin American studies. Not only have academics moved beck and forth between academia and the various agencies of the government. but the state has also attempted to shape the kinds of research undertaken. Hence. ideas about Latin America tend to reﬂect and constitute state interests**. For example. Santana(1996. p. 459) illustrates how US-based geographical researchers in Puerto Ricoadvanced a theory of ‘non-viability‘, suggesting that the island was ‘not viable asan independent state‘. Such studies were used to support arguments torcontinued US occupation.Second**, Latin American studies scholars have used organizing concepts that facilitate reductionism and allow the region to be analyzed as a coherent unit**. Thisis especialy true after the Second World War, when the US government began topromote area studies. In the newly conceived world reg'on framework, the term‘Latin America‘ replaced ‘South America‘ (Martin and Wigen, 1997. p. 162). Areastudies presumed the existence of coherent. naturally bounded regions. whereiihuman-environment relations had produced unique cultural groups.Contemporary REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIES of Latin America continue in this traritionby seeking to delineate the core cultural traits crganmng the region. Thus.Clawson‘s (1997, p. 7) textbook deﬁnes Latin America as a ‘cultural entity‘ boundby ‘a common Latin, or Roman, heritage‘. Clawson identiﬁes the core as that seawhere Latin or Hispanic culture is dominant: in fringe areas such as the USSouthwest and the Caribbean. ‘traditional Hispanic values are largely **Such demarcations between what properly belongs inside and outside a region are deeply problematic, for they obscure differences within nations and render invisible the interconnections and interdependencies between them**. **Third, Latin American studies tend to use the USA as the frame of reference or benchmark for encoding representations of, and measuring the material progess in, Latin America** (Berger. 1995; Schoultz, 1998). **As a result, academic knowledge tends to be underwritten by a United n American -Other binary, which constitutes difference and distance within a hierarchical framing. No matter the theoretical approach used in the USA, from environmental determinism in the 1930s to area studies, regional geographies and development studies from the 1940s on, Latin America is conﬁrmed to embody everything that the USA is not: handicapped by climate and geography, isolated, backward, traditional. violent. peripheral. underdeveloped and poor. Such IIMGNATIVEGEOGRAPHIES are called upon to authorize or legitimize US intervention in the region**. whether to protect national interests or foster development (Santana.1996).

#### Independently the term “Latin America” is utilized in a racist manner to elevate the Western European heritage over all other backgrounds. This marginalizes racial and cultural diversity and contributes to a faulty epistemology. This problem guarantees failure for distribution efforts of engagement. Without the plan all other alternatives will fail.

1. **Demuro 12**
2. Examining ‘Latinidad’ in Latin America:Race, ‘Latinidad’ and the Decolonial Option Eugenia Demuro Ph.D. from the University of SydneyVisiting Fellow, School of Language Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences,Australian National Universityhttp://www.acrawsa.org.au/files/ejournalfiles/187Demurofinalversion.pdf
3. Following the conquest and colonisation of the Americas, **the concept of race, as a category, became instrumental to social organisation and, significantly, continues to be a powerful stratagem today. This is clearly evident in** the idea of Latinidad (Latinity) that underscores **the nomenclature ‘Latin America’, which continues to elevate European heritage to the detriment of all other racial or ethnic groups.** We can see this, for example, in the fact that whilst an Aymaran Amerindian from Bolivia may not share much with an Afro-Cuban from Santiago, or with a porteñofrom Buenos Aires, or a Mexican from Tijuana, each is deemed to be Latin American. **Given the cultural heterogeneity of the region, it seems imprecise to speak of Latin America as though there were no marked differences between the nations, regions, cultures and peoples of the huge landmass that extends from the south of Río Grande to Tierra del Fuego. It is difficult to employ the term Latin America with any validity for a number of reasons:** to reiterate, **it** is the referent of an incredibly vast and heterogeneous region; additionally, the term emerged as the result of conflicts between imperial nations and was hence applied to the region from outside(see Mignolo 2005); and, most importantly, the very idea of Latinidad **functions to define Latin American identity in relation to the European heritages, and erases and marginalises the racial and cultural diversity of people residing in Latin America. For these reasons, the term Latin America and its continued usage must be seen as part of a larger program of coloniality that began with the inception of the Americas as the New World in the 15thcentury, and that continues today through global, Western capitalism and its accompanying epistemology.** In Latin America, the colonial project that began with the arrival of Europeans did not end with the cessation of Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule. In fact, **coloniality persists today and is evident in the distribution of wealth and resources across the region and the globe.**

#### And racism makes the impact of the negative inevitable. It alone can justify the killings and wars of the 1nc.

Foucault 76 (Michel, Professor of philosophy at the college de france, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976*, p. 254-258) jl

What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die"-function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I-as species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous" I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the blopower system in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a blopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder- the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From this point onward, war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying tha**t** [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race. In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving one's own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer. At the end of the nineteenth century, we have then a new racism modeled on war. It was, I think, required because a biopower that wished to wage war had to articulate the will to destroy the adversary with the risk that it might kill those whose lives it had, by definition, to protect, manage, and multiply. The same could be said of criminality. Once the mechanism of biopower was called upon to make it possible to execute or isolate criminals, criminality was conceptualized in racist terms. The same applies to madness, and the same applies to various abnormalities. I think that, broadly speaking, racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality. You can see that, here, we are far removed from the ordinary racism that takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races. We are also far removed from the racism that can be seen as a sort of ideoloical operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that is directed toward [them], or which is tormenting the social body, onto a mythical adversary. I think that this is something much deeper than an old tradition, much deeper than a new ideology, that it is something else. The specificity of modern racism, or what gives it its specificity, is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies, or the lies of power. It is bound up with the technique of power, with the technology of power. It is bound up with this, and that takes us as far away as possible from the race war and the intelligibility of history. We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition of-or the way biopower functions through-the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation, of racism. And it is, I think here that we find the actual roots of racism.

#### Rather than continuing to engage in the regional policies that group all nations south of the United States together, we offer the following plan: The United States federal government will increase government to government economic engagement with Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela.

### Contention 3 – Solvency

#### The naming of Latin America by current policy establishes a presence where situations in Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela are relegated to the realm of invisible. This myth must be deconstructed by replacing the current mapping of “Latin American policy” with a geopsychoanalysis which is critical to embracing the political. Only by naming the countries do we establish the narrative that can solve the oppression inherent in the status quo.

**Cooppan 09**

Worlds Within: National Narratives and Global Connections in Postcolonial writing ... pg 28-32

 By Vilashini Cooppan (professor of literature and feminist studies at Univ of California Santa Cruz)

**Derrida suggests that the IPA cannot name Latin America as any-**

**thing other than “all America south of the border” because, for this audience of international analysts, it is literally unassimilable, the trace of a**

**dark history of collaboration between the repressive apparatus of the state,**

**including torture. and the institution of psychoanalysis in a certain Latin**

**American country**. namely. Argentina. **What’s in a name? A country by**

**any other name, or indeed no name at all, smells even sweeter. And so**

**does an institution. Derrida takes the lPA's failure either to name Latin**

**America or to entertain a mechanism by which it might be named—for**

**example, a system of absentee voting that would allow those practicing**

**psychoanalysis in Argentina's repressive regime to weigh in—as the sign**

**of an institutional “axiomatics of presence” that allows the disappearance**

**of other unspeakable things** (346). To condemn, as the lPA's Executive Council declaration does, the ‘violation of human rights, of the rights of citizens in general and of intellectuals and our colleagues in particular“ in

“some geographical areas‘ is. Derrida argues, to piggybaclt dangerously on a long ethieo-political discourse on value and to seelt. in the self-interested invocation of certain universalist terms associated with the discourse of human rights, protection from more unsettling questions (35). **The unnamed phantom nation at the heart of the IPA’s declaration is, for Derrida, coextensive with everything else psychoanalysis fails to see in seeing only itself, including history, politics, ethics. philosophy,**

**and geopolitics. The absent nation is not the only thing Derrida wishes**

**to conjure into presence by “naming Latin America,’ the gesture that**

**opens and closes his lecture, as well as punctuating the vast majority of**

**the statements in between (327, 35:). But the spectral presences that the**

**naming of Latin America calls into being—monster states, citizen victims, an institution that plays both parts, and a territorial complex of power and politics that psychoanalysis denies at its peril—all circle back to the nation as their metonymic equivalent. To choose not to live with the ghost of the national, to believe one might**. **like the ostrich with its had in the sand, banish something by refusing to see or name it is tantamount, in Derrida? critique, to refusing to live in the world. The nation, in this sense, is the world; it is what psychoanalysis has to see if it is to live at all beyond its globalizing imperatives**. In 'Psychoanalysis Searches the State of lts Soul,” a more recent installment of a career-long critique of psychoanalysis inﬂected by his later concerns with the dangers of national-territorial philosophies, Derrida Faults psychoanalysis For having had “neither the means nor the right“ to condemn the practices of sovereign ambition, including state terror, the death penalty, and other forms of legalized suffering and cruelty. Psychoanalysis. asserts Derrida in this 2.000 address to the States General of Psychoanalysis Conference in Paris. is iuelf dominated by "a certain onto-theological metaphysics of sovereilgnty (autonomy and omnipotence of the subjcct—individual or state—freedom, egological will, conscious intentionality or if you will, the ego, the ego ideal, and the superego, etc.)."\* Psychoanalysis stands guilty of a Fundamental territorialistn that ﬁnds its most damning expression in a parochial Europeanism—not the new Europe of the European Union but the old Europe of sovereign nations, the Europe with whose moment the birth of psychoanalysis coincided and which it has never, in Derrida’: opinion, outgrown. **Derrida’s addresses deconstruct the geopolitical sense of an institution that makes maps yet misses places, englobes the world yet loses the political, either by occluding the nation or miming it**. This critique of psychoanaly-

sis unfolds from the position, as Derrida nots in "Geopsychoanalysis," ofa speaking symptom. A symptom. he well knows. always points backward to a history and forward to a future, to the transformational possibility of life after symptomatic expression, life changed because it has been brought to an awareness of what it once refused to recognize. For psychoanalysis, Derrida implies. **the Future entails replacing an abstract map devoid of any**

**proper names save its own (Freud. Klein. jung, Lacan) with the naming.**

**which is also to say the calling—the calling forth, the calling out—of poli-**

**tics. Derrida concludes “Geopsychoanalysis" by reminding his audience of**

**French and Latin American analysts that what is written in capital letters**

**on the Latin American continent could, if projected onto a large screen,**

**just as well reveal what is written in small, even undecipherable. letters**

**in the so-called liberal democracies of Europe and North America (351).**

**In naming Latin America, Derrida implies, one also names the dim and**

**ﬂickering state of human rights in many other parts of the world. includ-**

**ing those nations that take for granted their exemplary status. A map, as**

**Derrida reads it, becomes a model of movement. For all that it is grounded**

**in a particular national place and time, the name of Latin America also**

**opens itself to the oscillatory circuits of reference as it simultaneously des-**

**ignates Europe and North America as well, both its own history of abuse**

**and disavowal and some more collective Future. Such moving reference**

**is a kind of hope. It imagines a different politics in which nations and**

**institutions**. psychoanalysis included, will hold themselves accountable for what is done in t/m'r name. The psychoanalysis l talte from Derrida’s map of a Latin America is a psychoanalysis willing both to name the national referent and to watch it move. Read further as what Michel de Ccrteau calls a "strateg[y] of time” that “recognizes the past in the present,” the psychoanalysis with which I am concerned is one that, again in de Certeau's words, “treats the relation as one of imbrication (one in the place of the other), or repetition (one reproduces the other in another form)."" lrnbrication, repetition, and substitution constitute the structural leitmotif of the narratives of nationalism this boolt examines, **narratives in which the nation is at once itself** **and other, once and future, self-same and subject to change. The nation** **in these narratives is variously secret sharer (the national as shadow of the** **global), ghost (the nation as recurring specter in postcolonial literature** **and politics), and fetish (the nation as a style of belief that never quite** **masks the essential lack of the thing itself). To grasp the nation in these** **various guises is to see it as a particular kind of critical trace. The concept** **of fantasmatic national identiﬁcation brings psychoanalysis and deconstruction together in order to mark the coordinates of the national subject** **whose place is the peculiar timespace of desire. As the setting or stage**

**of the subject, desire is as much the world of the subject as any territory,**

**whether national or global or both.** Nationalism is a rhetoric of belonging that is always subtended, and often subverted, by longing. But which desires? Whose desires? How many desires? Desire's law is local and plural, not general and singular. And desire comes up. in all uses, against the power of the law.

#### Each of the topic countries have different objectives with differing possible solutions, means that individual engagement will always be more effective

Roberts and Walser 13, (James M. Roberts' The Heritage Foundation's lead expert in economic freedom and growth, and PhD and senior policy analyst, 1-7-13, Latin America and the Caribbean: A Wish List for 2013, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/us-foreign-policy-wish-list-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-in-2013>)

Prepare for a Post-Chavez Venezuela

Although slated to begin another six-year term on January 10, President Hugo Chavez appears to be losing his battle against cancer. According to the constitution, Chavez’s incapacitation or death will trigger new presidential elections. While a post-Chavez Venezuela will remain polarized and deinstitutionalized, the next presidential election should be free and fair.

The Obama Administration is reportedly contemplating restoring relations at the ambassadorial level. It cannot, however, paper over the adversarial nature of current relations. The U.S. should seek concrete commitments—including a firm renunciation of terrorism and an agreement on combating narcotics trafficking—before sending a new ambassador to Caracas.

A strategy of long-term democracy support should focus on civil society, youthful democratic leaders, and victims of Chavista misrule. The Obama Administration should also focus U.S. intelligence capabilities on probing and countering Iranian penetration into Venezuela and uncovering the misdeeds of corrupt narco-generals and high officials.

Liberty for Cuba

Cuba is in the twilight of the totalitarian reign of the Castros. Choruses of liberal and business voices in the U.S. demand an end to the Cuba embargo and more unilateral openness. They blame an absence of progress in Cuban–American relations on a band of Cuban–American politicians. They are wrong. The true source of non-progress resides in Havana, where the regime is hopelessly wedded to a political-economic model designed by 1950s-style Communist revolutionaries.

Now, with patron Hugo Chavez apparently dying and the octogenarian Castros fading, is not the moment to toss the regime an economic lifesaver. U.S. policy should focus clearly on a genuine transition to an open, non-repressive, democratic, and economically free Cuba, not just a succession to Castro-less communism. The U.S. can offer real policy changes in exchange for genuine freedom of information, expression, and travel for all Cubans. The Obama Administration should also press harder for the release of American hostage Alan Gross.

A Healthy U.S.–Mexican Relationship

Mexico’s ongoing fight against organized crime has cast a doleful shadow over U.S.–Mexican relations. New Mexican President Enrique Pe&ntilde;a Nieto promises to restore citizen security and continue overhauling Mexico’s police and judiciary. Often overlooked in the U.S. is Mexico’s emerging economic status—the world’s 11th largest and gathering steam. Serious energy reforms could reverse an alarming decline in oil production and tap massive shale gas deposits.

In short, the bilateral relationship is strong but not entirely healthy. President Obama should make ties with Mexico a serious priority by helping Mexico fight organized crime through the Merida Initiative, enhance military-to-military ties, and act jointly in troubled Central America. The President needs to assume White House ownership of the ambivalent muddle over marijuana legalization and U.S. drug consumption. Real border security cooperation and immigration reform with a viable temporary work visa program are other prescriptions for a healthier relationship

#### This homogenization of Latin America undercuts effective policy implementation. Only a focus on specific countries sends a clear message toward increased economic engagement.

**Navia (prof of global studies at NYU) 11**

How Successful Was Obama's Trip to Latin America? By Peter Hakim, Patricio Navia, Cynthia Arnson
*Latin America Advisor, March 30, 2011* http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2631

Patricio Navia, master teacher of global studies at New York University: **"There is a clear lesson from Obama's trip to Latin America. U.S. presidents should** refrain in the future from traveling to the region as a whole-unless they attend a regional summit-and instead should **focus on** travelingto **individual countries within the region. Latin America has grown very diverse in terms of economic and social development. The political evolution of the region's democracies-or absence thereof in Cuba-has also taken on different paths depending on the specific countries. Relations with the United States have also evolved differently depending on the bilateral agenda items. Some countries are more concerned with immigration; others worry more about trade or drug policies. Thus, U.S. presidents should accept that Latin America is no longer a homogenous region and they should refrain from seeking to send the same message to all countries.** Different agenda items require different messages. Different priorities necessitate designing and implementing different policies. President Obama's trip to Brazil was successful because he focused on bilateral U.S.-Brazilian issues. The **visits to Chile and El Salvador were less so because Obama brought a message to the entire region and did not pay sufficient attention to the bilateral issues those two countries have with the United States. Had Obama sought to reach more narrow objectives in his trip, addressing issues that concerned Chile and El Salvador, he would have sent a clearer invitation to other Latin American countries to engage bilaterally with Washington to advance their own agendas.**"

#### Finally the plan is the key to understanding the topic. Terms such as Latin America have been uncritically utilized without examination. This develops an essentialist discourse. Only the conceptual shift of the 1ac functions to generate a polyphonic epistemology that changes the current structures of knowledge.

**Jimenez 10**

UN PIE AQUÍ Y OTRO ALLÁ: TRANSLATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND HYBRIDIZATION IN THE NEW WORLD (B)ORDERA Thesis presentedbyJORGE JIMÉNEZ-BELLVERhttp://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1505&context=theses

In this respect, I suggested that **the interplay of translatability and hybridization in Latin America has been guided by neo-Babelian models of fusion without contradiction. Indeed, the phrase “Latin America” has uncritically been taken to signify the translation of native populations into Latin languages and their submission to European paradigms that, In turn, mistranslated those populations following Eurocentric ideological and discursive systems.** Inspired by the interdependenceof hybridizationand translatability as ongoingfertile processes that affect human cultures from within, I proposed **a conceptual shift that problematizes the dominant articulation of temporal dynamics in Latin America**.Such articulationoperates under the coloniality of power,while the shift I proposed **underscores the network of conflicts, negotiations, and alliances that underlie multitemporal heterogeneity.** By so doing, I didnot intendto reaffirm or celebrate hybridization regardless of the asymmetries in which it appears embedded―let alone negate resistance to hybridization. **Rather, I attempted to detach the analysis of identity formation from the binarized logic of essentialist discourse and favor an improved understanding of the hermeneutical capacity of hybridization to account for the complex and multiple interactions of historical temporalities in the configuration of what is known today as Latin America. In this regard, I sought to underscore the power of translation not merely to echo the forces of the center and hence foster cultural inequality, but to generate a polyphonic epistemology that diversifies and redefines prevailing structures of meaning and knowledge.**